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Critical Dialogue
By beginning from a duty to obey and neglecting white
supremacy, Rawls’s inﬂuential conceptualization of
nonviolent civil disobedience sees like a white state. By
demonstrating how the civil rights movement actively
imagined its struggle in anticolonial terms, Pineda contends that political theorists should learn from the civil
rights movement’s understanding of civil disobedience as a
form of decolonizing praxis. By showing how the Birmingham campaign’s tactics succeeded less as an instance
of Habermasian discourse ethics and more as forms of
crisis-generating coercion to “force the better argument,”
Pineda indicates how disclosing white supremacy’s
embedded violence was integral to its success. All these
strengths lead readers to more profound understandings of
Rawls and Habermas, as well as the insights of civil rights
activists. Readers led to appreciate the complex intertwining of communication and coercion in the Birmingham
protests are left, nevertheless, with questions regarding
which forms of force might be legitimate and when. Such
questions, however, should not take away from Seeing like
an Activist’s important achievements.
Response to Paul A. Passavant’s Review of Seeing
like an Activist: Civil Disobedience and the Civil
Rights Movement
doi:10.1017/S1537592722000858

— Erin R. Pineda
Paul Passavant’s thoughtful, generous review of my book,
Seeing like an Activist: Civil Disobedience and the Civil Rights
Movement, raises an important question about the use of
violence by protesters. Passavant asks, in short, “When or
what sort of force or violence is legitimate?” It is a question
that all theorists of activism recurrently face and one that I
resist in my book. Without discounting the value of the
question or the scholarly approaches that make it central, I
would like to discuss why I appear to—and in fact do—place
it on the sidelines in my book and then consider what is both
gained and lost by doing so.
Passavant carefully reconstructs my critique of Rawls’s
inﬂuential treatment of civil disobedience, noting how
the Rawlsian approach evades the constitutive entanglement of coercion and communication, placing the latter
out of bounds for properly civil disobedience within
societies that meet the condition of “nearly just.” The
question then becomes, If forms of coercion are operative within civil disobedience, what are the limitations on
that coercion? As Passavant puts it, “the problem of
legitimacy falls by the wayside, thereby leaving the reader
with the coercion of forcing the better argument, but
lacking the better argument in the absence of a discussion of legitimacy.”
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This lack, however, is precisely the one that confronted the activists and organizers of the long Black
freedom struggle: How should we think about limitations on the use of dissenting force or violence within a
society that is organized on the basis of anti-Black
violence and yet in fundamental ways takes itself to be
orderly, nonviolent, legitimate, and democratic? If we
take the violence of US white supremacy and settler
colonialism to be co-constitutive with the state’s identity
as a democracy—if it is, as Joel Olson theorized, not a
democracy but a white democracy—then there is no
immanent, already extant standard of legitimacy that
can provide the measure.
To be sure, civil rights activists invoked equality before
the law, the principle of equal personhood, and the value
of freedom; yet on my reading they did so less as an appeal
to a shared standard of legitimacy and more as a risky,
creative, provisional act of construction—appealing to an
idea not yet real, whose horizons not only lie beyond the
United States and its founding documents but also require
subjects and relations not yet brought into being. Their
actions were ungrounded in this way; legitimacy would be
the outcome perhaps but could not provide a starting
point.
My worry has long been that engaging with questions of
activist practice from the standpoint of justiﬁcation and
legitimacy—when, where, and under what conditions are
certain kinds of actions permissible or legitimate?—crowds
out questions about action: What do certain forms of action
(in this case, decolonizing praxis) do in the world? Although
the former is one question we might pose, in my view, it is
too often the only one.
Yet Passavant is no doubt correct that the question of
political violence is a meaningful one that should not be
evaded. Instead of asking about legitimacy, however, I
might ask about the ethical and political purposes of
coercion, force, and violence as part of activist praxis.
Thinking with the activist-theorists of the civil rights
movement, we might ask what popular uses of coercion
and force do to deconstruct a world already built on
violence, and what they do to construct a diﬀerent world.
This is a question related to Passavant’s but not reducible
to it.
For ﬁgures like Martin Luther King Jr., uses of violence
under white supremacy—that is, bodily or intense psychological harm against other persons—could not deliver
the mutuality and reciprocity that, for him, provided the
horizon of true liberation. This was his answer, but it is
only one. Still, I ﬁnd it instructive for how it orients our
attention—not to the problem of justiﬁcation but to the
world-building capacities of action. It is there that I think
we should begin, and I am grateful to Passavant for the
provocation to do so.

